Firms that change their listing from the less regulated AIM to the more regulated main section of the London Stock Exchange exhibit positive abnormal returns on the announcement day. For firms moving in the opposite direction, both announcement and implementation day abnormal returns are negative. Following implementation, the pattern is reversed for both categories of firm. We show that differences in liquidity, conventional risk factors and in medium to long term firm survival rates between the two listing regimes do not explain the observed patterns of returns, suggesting that the answer lies in the different bonding requirements of the two market segments and an agency risk premium.
Introduction
Determining the level of corporate governance regulation that balances the costs of disclosure and compliance requirements with the benefits of a stock exchange listing is an important and challenging problem. The "bonding hypothesis" proposed by Coffee (1999) and Stulz (1999) suggests that firms can bond themselves to good corporate governance by listing on a foreign stock exchange with higher governance standards and thus constrain insiders from appropriating wealth from minority shareholders. Likewise, Skaife, Collins and LaFond (2004) demonstrate that a firm's corporate governance attributes influence both its systematic and non-systematic risk and, hence, its cost of capital, implying the existence of "agency risk" as an asset pricing variable.
Firm managers may mitigate agency risk by committing the firm to greater bonding, thus signalling to investors that agency costs will be easier to control. One way of doing this is to seek a listing on an exchange that requires greater bonding commitments: either by a cross listing, or by a migration. Motivations for cross listing have been examined in a number of studies (e.g. Hail and Leuz, 2009; Lel and Miller, 2008; Doige, Karolyi, and Stulz 2007; Pagano, Roell and Zechner, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Amira and Muzere, 2011) . The primary focus of these studies is firms that list on, or migrate to, a more regulated exchange, rather than on firms that migrate from a more to a less regulated exchange.
The present study falls into a related category of studies that examine migrations between different regulatory and governance regimes within the same geographic or legal jurisdiction (e.g. Leitterstorf, Nicoletti and Winkler, 2008; Jenkinson and Ramadorai 2013; Vismara, Paleari and Ritter, 2012) . Specifically, we investigate migrations between two sections of the London Stock Exchange (LSE): the Official List (main section) and the smaller Alternative Investment Market (AIM). An advantage of focusing on firms that transfer between different tiers of the same market is that we automatically control for the legal protection afforded to shareholders and the stock exchange trading technology. A within-country study such as ours also reveals the ability of a stock exchange to influence the level of investor protection over and above that provided by existing law.
We define agency risk as the ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the nature and magnitude of agency costs. Unlike conventional risk factors such as market, size, style, momentum and liquidity, agency risk arises from the information asymmetry between agents who control information about the firm and outside investors (principals) who make capital allocation decisions. We argue that by its nature, such risk is firm specific and difficult to parameterise with a known probability distribution. Principals do not know ex-ante what, if any, information is being withheld by agents; in other words, they do not know what they do not know, so we conceive of this risk as Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1985 (Knight, [1921 ).
1 The entrepreneur earns a profit as the reward for bearing this uncertainty by agreeing predetermined contractual obligations with labourers and other resource suppliers in exchange for uncertain residual returns (Knight, 1985 (Knight, [1921 , pp 269 -270). As an entrepreneur's business develops and a trading history emerges, the balance may shift from uncertainty towards insurable risk -where possible outcomes can be classified and subjective probabilities assigned to them -although uncertainty is never eliminated and the shift can be reversed (Knight, 1985 (Knight, [1921 . Firms listed on the AIM are typically early stage ventures, so we posit that agency risk will be greater than for firms listed on the Official List. Firms migrating between the two bonding regimes are subjected to a change in bonding obligations that directly causes a change to the level of agency risk faced by their investors: in the low bonding regime of the AIM, agency risk is higher, whereas in the high bonding regime of the Official List it is lower.
We argue that when agency risk increases, investors demand a premium on the cost of capital over and above that captured by standard models such as the CAPM or Fama and French (1993) model. We base this proposition on the grounds that agency risk is driven by firm specific characteristics rather than macro events and is not necessarily constrained by firm size, leverage or market to book ratios. In addition, the agency risk of individual firms is likely to persist over multi-year periods. However, we argue that a listing migration between the two segments of the London market triggers a change in the level of agency risk perceived by investors, given the different bonding requirements, which results in a change to the cost of capital to reflect the new agency risk premium. The dividend discount model implies that in the absence of changes in cash flows a change in the cost of capital will change firm value. Ceteris paribus, subsequent returns will reflect the new cost of capital. Thus, a unique contribution of our study is to examine the effect of changes in the level of agency risk on firm value and the cost of capital.
We test our hypothesis by studying returns surrounding the announcement and implementation of migrations between two sections of the LSE. Returns attributable to the agency risk premium are identified using a return generating model that, in addition to market, size and book to market risk factors, also controls for industry and liquidity risk.
The latter is measured by the bid-ask-spread, which also controls for time variation in information asymmetry (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) . Though we cannot measure agency risk directly, as it is inherently unobservable, by including in our model the other possible explanatory variables identified in the asset pricing literature we are able to attribute the residual (abnormal) returns not explained by our model to the agency risk premium.
Our study makes five contributions to the literature. First, we draw attention to the role of agency risk in explaining the differential returns of firms in the two listing regimes. Second, we use daily returns as opposed to the weekly returns typically used in other studies, and a benchmark returns model that controls for industry residual returns and the possibility of an interaction between market risk and change of listing status. and Mohamed (2012) we find that while short term survival rates are somewhat higher for firms seeking promotion, the medium to long term survival rates are identical for both categories of firm. This suggests that differences in bankruptcy risk do not drive the observed return patterns, implying that differences in agency risk are responsible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we consider the UK institutional context with respect to the LSE and AIM. The theoretical background and hypotheses are detailed in section 3, followed by a discussion of the data characteristics in section 4. The results and conclusions are presented in sections 5 and 6 respectively.
The London Stock Exchange and AIM
Taken together the two sections of the LSE have characteristics which make them particularly suited to a study of the influence of the regulatory environment on the cost of capital. For example, although the main market of the LSE ranks highly in terms of the level of investor protection provided (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Bebchuk, 2005; Bebchuk, 2007; Becht, Franks, and Rossi, 2009 ) the AIM section of the LSE is, arguably, one of the most lightly regulated markets in the developed World. Additionally, more than twice as many firms transfer from the main market to the AIM as transfer in the other direction. It is unusual to see such a high number of firms seeking to migrate from a more regulated exchange to a less regulated exchange within the same jurisdiction. In fact, on many junior exchanges, it is either not possible for them to accept firms from their more senior counterparts, or else such an occurrence is considered exceptional. Firms listed on most multi-tier exchanges typically seek promotion to a more senior exchange, or, if delisting, seek a complete removal of their quotation.
The less stringent governance, reporting and listing requirements faced by AIM firms compared to the main market is a characteristic that, arguably, results in a higher cost of capital. Firms listed on the main market are subject to the "comply or explain" principle of properly assess a company's suitability for AIM, or for tolerating post-listing misdemeanours, should compel Nomads to perform their roles diligently. The AIM can thus be regarded as a "reputational market" in which investors rely on the character of Nomads as a proxy for the quality of listed firms, rather than on the market's regulations (Mendoza, 2008) . However, the Nomad-client relationship is complicated by the fact that the Nomad is hired and paid for by the client, leading Gerakos, Lang and Maffett (2013) While exonerating the firms, it found that Nabarro Wells had acted without "due skill and care", had "failed to undertake the necessary level of due diligence to assess the appropriateness of certain firms for admission to AIM" including one "company's inability to raise the required funds on admission which was necessary to achieve the assumed growth projections included in its working capital report" (London Stock Exchange, 2007b,
The second censure was published in June 2009 when the Nomad Blue Oar Securities (since renamed as Astaire Securities) was fined £225,000 for failing to question the accuracy of its client's announcements and to assess its ongoing suitability for an AIM listing (London Stock Exchange, 2009). Though not disclosed in the Disciplinary Notice, the client was identified in the press as the company Worthington Nicholls Group plc, whose business involves installing air conditioning and ventilation in hotels (Taylor, 2009 ).
Among the announcements by Worthington Nicholls that Blue Oar knew were inaccurate or misleading, but failed to prevent, was a reference to a "high percentage of recurring revenue" when orders received had actually fallen from £932,077 to £164,580 (a decrease noted by Blue Oar in an email to the client) and a reference to discussions for potential deals with "five hotel chains, which, in aggregate, own in excess of 90 hotels" when in reality
Worthington Nicholls was in contractual negotiations with just one hotel from each of the five chains (London Stock Exchange, 2009, p 7).
The third case was disclosed in December 2011 when the disciplinary committee of AIM publicly censured the Nomad Seymour Pierce and imposed a record fine of £400,000 for breaches of four Nomad rules in relation to two client firms that occurred in 2010 (London Stock Exchange, 2011c). The LSE had conducted a routine visit to review Seymour Pierce's conduct as a nominated adviser in May 2010, as a result of which various concerns and recommendations had been raised about its standard of work. However, the LSE "did not initially receive from Seymour Pierce the level of co-operation it had expected or required in relation to the matters it had raised" (London Stock Exchange, 2011c, p 4). Further investigation then resulted in the public censure notice, which discloses that in one case Seymour Pierce failed to provide proper advice and guidance to a client in relation to the client's obligation to inform the market promptly of material changes in its financial situation. The client's share price rose by 80 per cent on news of a healthy order book, only for it to be placed into administration three weeks later, having failed to disclose that the directors had issued a short-term working capital loan to the company four weeks earlier. In the other case it failed to carry out proper due diligence on a client planning to list on AIM.
The most troubling aspect of this censure is that at the time of its announcement Seymour
Pierce was the largest Nomad on AIM, advising 74 firms.
The diligence with which Nomads perform their duties is questioned by Mallin and OwYong (2010) . Based on interviews with two Nomads that advised more than 160 AIM firms, accounting for more than 10% of UK incorporated AIM firms at the time, they formed the impression that the brokering services also provided by these Nomads to their clients was "far more important" than their role as a Nomad, which they tended to view in a "passive capacity". The opinions of the 19 directors of AIM firms interviewed by Mallin and OwYong (2010) was mixed, with some indicating that their Nomad had been very supportive whilst others indicated that they had received little support. The general view formed by the authors from interviews with four institutional investors is that the Nomad is not a significant factor in the decision to invest in an AIM company. A survey of 20 institutional investors conducted in 2010 by Baker Tilly found that as many as 70% of them believed that further increases in regulation of the AIM market were required (Baker Tilly, 2011 guidelines for good practice contained in the QCA Guidelines is put into effect.
Like the UK Corporate Governance Code, the QCA Guidelines specify the need for independent non-executive directors, for separating the role of chairman and chief executive, for establishing remuneration and audit committees made up of non-executive directors, setting up a nomination committee to recommend board appointments, and establishing a dialogue with shareholders. However, the QCA Guidelines are generally less demanding:
for example, a minimum of two independent non-executive directors are recommended by the QCA Guidelines, one of whom may be the Chairman if deemed independent at the time of appointment, whereas the UK Corporate Governance Code recommends that independent non-executive directors should comprise at least half the board, excluding the Chairman. 4 In the absence of a mandatory requirement to adopt a particular corporate governance code, directors of an AIM company have a degree of flexibility and discretion in their approach to corporate governance. With guidance from their Nomad, AIM directors can put in place systems that balance the needs and resources of what is often a smaller, growing business against the need to have an effective governance system that will deliver transparency and trust between the board and the shareholders. However, if they fail to strike the right balance between the proportionality of governance systems and their effectiveness, they risk undermining shareholder confidence.
Over and above compliance (or otherwise) with corporate governance guidelines, AIM firms have to abide by the rules for admission to the market and thereafter comply with a number of continuing obligations to maintain their listing. In Europe, there are two legally defined ways to access the capital market: 'EU-regulated markets' and markets regulated by the stock exchanges themselves ('exchange regulated markets'). As the AIM is an 'exchange regulated market', the rules are set by the LSE and, as we have seen, are based on the company's relationship with its Nomad. In contrast, the main market of the LSE is an 'EU-regulated market' that requires firms to produce a full prospectus for approval by the UK Listing Authority (UKLA) and then to abide by the continuing obligations which apply to all admitted firms, such as ensuring that price sensitive information is made available to all investors at the same time. Both the admissions criteria and the continuing obligations are significantly less onerous for AIM firms than for main market firms (and our analysis of the published explanations for migrations in Table 1 indicates that 'cost savings, simplifications of reporting/regulation' is mentioned by a sizeable number of the firms moving down to the AIM). For example, whereas main market firms must have a three-year trading record and ensure a minimum of 25 per cent of the shares are in public hands after flotation, AIM firms require no trading record and there is no minimum free float. As a result many firms listed on the AIM have concentrated shareholdings. It is in fact possible to create a new company and have it listed on the AIM within two to three weeks, provided a Nomad can be found.
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There is considerable overlap in size between firms listed on the AIM and on the main Board composition is an area where many AIM firms are weak when benchmarked against the UK Corporate Governance Code, which requires that boards have a balance of executive and non-executive directors. Only half of medium sized AIM firms (with a market capitalisation between £40 million and £100 million) that were sampled by Snell and O'Brien (2008) were found to have a majority of non-executive directors on their board, though this rose to 71% for the Top 100. This is important given evidence that shareholder wealth increases when the proportion of outside directors increases (eg Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990) . Whereas the UK Corporate Governance Code requires firms to separate the roles of Board Chairman and CEO, up to 45% of AIM firms were found to combine these roles (Snell and O'Brien, 2008) . So doing creates a conflict of interest which has been found to reduce firm performance, increase CEO compensation and reduce the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance (Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Goyal and Park, 2002) .
Many AIM firms have never made a profit and can be characterized as pure plays on a particular technology or business plan. As a result, they may be perceived as riskier than firms listed on the main market, which generally have a longer trading history, a more demonstrable record of profitability and a higher free float. When AIM firms are able to demonstrate a sustainable record of profitability and a market capitalization exceeding £500m they are encouraged by the LSE to transfer their listing to the main market, but this is not obligatory (Arcot, Black, and Owen, 2007, p. 39) . In fact, we find that more than twice as many firms move from the main market to the AIM than move in the opposite direction, while the overlap in size between firms on both exchanges suggests that many firms choose not to seek promotion, even if they meet the criteria. Overall the listing migrations comprise transactions that are economically significant: the total value of firms moving up to the Official List over the study period from January 1996 through February 2011 was £22.3bn while the corresponding figure for firms moving down to the AIM was £4.8bn.
Although some firms on the main market may be tempted to move to the AIM to take advantage of its less prescriptive regime ("regulatory arbitrage") the LSE expect both nomads and institutional investors to ensure that firms raise their corporate governance standards as they increase in size (Arcot, Black and Owen, 2007, p. 23) . However, investigations of corporate governance disclosure among AIM firms have uncovered a variety of corporate governance practices, with larger AIM firms not necessarily providing better governance Ow-Yong, 1998, 2008; Snell and O'Brien, 2008 firms that use the AIM as a launching pad for the LSE are willing to incur greater regulatory costs to bond themselves to investors when they migrate upwards, while those LSE firms using the AIM as a landing pad are trading off greater agency costs against the reduced burden of regulation and disclosure when they migrate downwards.
The possibility that the lower standard of regulation on the AIM attracts lower quality firms that are unable to list in more regulated markets was investigated by Nielsson (2012) .
His results show that firms listed on AIM, although smaller in size, are equivalent in terms of profitability, growth and leverage to firms listed in the NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges in the U.S. and in two Continental European exchanges (the Deutsche Börse and Euronext).
He also demonstrates that the delisting pattern is the same across these markets and concludes that the AIM does not cater to lower quality firms.
As well as sending signals about future agency costs and firm performance, a decision to transfer a listing may have tax consequences for UK residents investing in main market and AIM firms. This is because, unlike firms listed on the AIM, firms on the main market are eligible for inclusion in an Individual Savings Accounts (ISA). An ISA is a tax shelter available as an annual allowance for individuals resident in the UK. For example, in the fiscal year 2013/14 an individual could pay up to £11,520 into a stocks and shares ISA, although this limit was considerably less at the beginning of the study period. Gains realised on investments held in ISAs are free of capital gains tax and dividends are taxed at the basic rate regardless of the tax bracket of the investor. Although not eligible for inclusion within an ISA investors in AIM firms enjoyed other generous tax benefits during the study period that were not available to investors in main market firms. These stem from a decision implemented in 2000 to treat firms listed on AIM as unquoted firms for tax purposes, producing benefits which include entrepreneurs' relief against capital gains tax (CGT), enterprise investment scheme tax relief and inheritance tax business property relief, though these benefits were less valuable after 2008 due to changes in the UK tax code. The existence of these multiple incentives suggests that the tax motivation is likely to be more powerful for firms migrating down to the AIM, and this is borne out in the information provided in Table 1 where the stated motivation of achieving 'tax benefits to investors' is not mentioned by any firms moving up to the main market but is mentioned by 34 firms migrating down to the AIM.
Relief against capital gains for investors moving down to the AIM is, however, only beneficial if investors are liable to CGT and is of no value for tax-exempt investors such as pension funds. The value of relief against inheritance tax depends upon whether individual investors foresee themselves as being liable to this tax, and even for such investors there are other well-established ways to reduce any potential liability. Further, the tax benefits of AIM investments are only of value to individuals who are subject to UK taxation. Though firms that switch their listing without providing adequate warning may trigger forced sales by investors with unforeseen tax liabilities, given the tax planning opportunities available to individuals to reduce the impact of such liabilities, and given that the AIM investor base comprises mainly institutional investors (Mendoza, 2008) , we believe that any tax impact is likely to be negligible. Nevertheless, as one of our robustness checks we control for liquidity changes around listing migrations to take account of any unusual trading activity that might occur.
Theoretical background and hypotheses
Firms may change their listing, or list on more than one exchange, when the group of investors with the greatest comparative advantage in assessing their value are based on a foreign exchange (the "investor recognition hypothesis" of Merton (1987) ). Alternatively, a listing change may occur when a foreign exchange has a higher listing standard, thus allowing the firm to signal to potential investors that it is prepared to subject itself to higher standards of disclosure and corporate governance, thereby justifying a lower cost of capital (the "bonding hypothesis", e.g. Coffee (1999)). A further possibility is that firms may change their listing when analyst coverage and the pool of potential investors is larger on another (usually foreign) exchange, resulting in greater liquidity and lower transaction costs (respectively, the "liquidity hypothesis" of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and the "market segmentation" hypothesis of Kadlec and McConnell (1994) ).
Competing exchanges can either "race to the top" or "race to the bottom" when setting their listing requirements. Indeed regulatory arbitrage can work both ways as firms may "race to the top" in seeking listings on exchanges with more stringent corporate governance standards than found in their home country (Coffee 1999; Piotroski and Srinavasan 2008 and Pagano et al. 2002) . In fact, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006, p. 458) argue that "high reputation" exchanges are likely to reinforce their comparative advantage by setting high listing standards, while "low reputation" exchanges will set lower standards and become lower-tier markets.
It is also probable that firms with concentrated ownership are inclined to avoid listing on exchanges where greater rights are afforded to minority shareholders Coffee (1999, p. 703 ).
According to this reasoning the AIM is likely to be favoured over the main market by firms with concentrated ownership not least due to the absence of free float restrictions on AIM firms. On the other hand, firms transferring down from the main market to the AIM might be expected to initially suffer a stock price fall, but eventually the additional risk premium required to compensate for the higher agency risk of the less regulated market should result in higher returns, in equilibrium. This reasoning generates our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Firm value will decrease immediately following the announcement and transfer of firms from the main market to the AIM, followed by subsequent higher returns. AIM2MAIN migrations subsequently increased relative to MAIN2AIM during the onset of the financial crisis in 2007 and remained higher through 2010, the final year of the study.
Characteristics of the data
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AIM2MAIN firms
After excluding foreign firms, firms with missing data and firms with non UK ISIN numbers, we are left with a sample of 111 firms which migrated from the AIM to main market. The reasons given by firms in their announcements for transferring their listing are summarized in Table 1 . The statements of 42% of the AIM2MAIN firms do not contain any justification of the re-listing decision. The migrations of 40 of the remaining firms coincides with a positive growth forecast or statement that the main market is now appropriate given the firm's size, 39 believe it will raise their profile, 36 believe a move to the main market will increase their shareholder base, and 30 explicitly state an expected improvement in liquidity among their motivations. Other reasons given include better regulation, easier to enact mergers and acquisitions, better analyst coverage and ability to attract talented personnel.
In Table 2 , it is reported that the majority of AIM2MAIN firms are from the DataStream consumer services sector (24) followed closely by financials (31), industrials (18), technology (14) and healthcare (11). The remaining five sectors -oil and gas, telecoms, utilities, basic materials and consumer goods -comprise a total of just 13 firms. Of the 111 firms in the sample, the median number of trading days between the announcement of a listing change and its enactment (implementation lag) is 39, the maximum is 607 and the minimum is 0 (one firm only: Staffware. 6 The median market capitalization on the implementation day is £122.5m and the maximum is £1.1bn.
-------------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here
MAIN2AIM firms
After excluding foreign firms, firms with missing data and firms with non UK ISIN numbers, we are left with a sample of 262 firms which migrated from the main to the AIM section, including MDY Healthcare which is entered twice because it moved from the main market to the AIM, back to the main market and then back to the AIM a second time. From firm must obtain prior approval of a resolution for cancellation of not less than 75% of shareholders at a general meeting. Firms must also inform shareholders that the resolution for cancellation has been passed within 20 days following the date of the resolution and inform them of the intended date of cancellation. However, both UKLA rules 5.2.7 and 5.2.12 outline situations where rule 5.2.5 does not apply and firms are only required to provide advance notice of 20 business days before the intended cancellation of listing. In addition, a conversation between one of the for private investors who may not be aware of the weaker shareholder protection mechanisms available on the AIM, particularly in situations where the requirements for a consultation period and shareholder approval for a delisting from the main market to the AIM are waived. It is also evident from Table 2 that the distribution of firms between sectors is somewhat different in the MAIN2AIM compared to the AIM2MAIN sample. The sector containing the most firms is industrials (79) followed by consumer services (44), consumer goods (41), technology (41) and financials (32). The remaining five sectorsbasic materials, utilities, telecoms, oil and gas and healthcare -comprise 24 firms.
At £9m the implementation day median market capitalization is much lower for the MAIN2AIM firms than the £123m median observed for the AIM2MAIN firms. This is consistent with the findings of Gerakos, Lang and Maffet (2013) to the effect that AIM2MAIN firms are likely to have exhibited recent growth and good performance while MAIN2AIM firms are likely to have exhibited poor performance and retrenchment.
Survival record of switching firms
A substantial proportion of both groups of firms ceased trading after their listing change, as summarized in Table 3 .
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Of the 111 AIM2MAIN firms, a total of 52% were classified by DataStream as no longer in existence by 4 th March 2011. Of all the AIM2MAIN firms, 41% survived for more than 5 years after migration and a clear majority survived for more than 3 years. The post implementation survival of the MAIN2AIM firms is similar to the AIM2MAIN counterparts as a total 52% of firms are classified as dead by the end of the study period. The rate at authors and a member of the technical team at the UKLA on the 22 nd August 2008 indicated that in exceptional circumstances, the requirement of a minimum of 20 business days of notice may also be waived. Nonetheless, Jenkinson and Ramadorai (2012) report that the rules were applied more rigorously from 2007 onwards and indeed, we find that from the beginning of 2007 the minimum implementation lag increased to 38 trading days and the median to 39 days. which MAIN2AIM firms die over the study period is similar to that of the AIM2MAIN sample and the majority of firms survive for 5 years or more, following migration.
Choice of event date
Standard event studies aim to capture the value of price sensitive information released on the event date which is reflected in the difference between the realized return and the expected return, based upon a return-generating model.
Many of the listing change announcements coincide with the release of other price sensitive information, such as annual results, interim results, fundraisings, trading statements and takeover bids. We hypothesize that promotions to the main market from AIM are likely to be associated with positive news, while transfers from the main market to the AIM are likely to be associated with unfavourable news, reflecting the possibility that a listing change may be a symptom rather than a cause of firm performance. Hence, we are able to make useful inferences about the overall health of firms making the respective announcements, both as reported on the announcement day and in the period leading up to the announcement by studying their price reaction on the announcement date.
We found little evidence of firms releasing additional price sensitive information on the implementation date, making this date 'clean' of confounding events. Implementation conveys the removal of the uncertainty, or execution risk. In the case of AIM2MAIN firms, it is also confirmation of the ability to meet the listing requirements of the main market. An event study based on the implementation date is also able to capture the effects of changes in liquidity arising as different categories of investors move into or out of a firm's stock around the migration date.
Hypothesis testing and results
Returns surrounding listing migrations
It is evident from Table 1 that a frequently cited motivation for a listing switch is to improve liquidity. Furthermore, switching firms are often small relative to the average size of firms listed on the LSE; they may be in high growth sectors; they may have higher or lower sensitivity to market risk than average; or they may have a higher or lower trading volume relative to similar firms. Therefore, in order to control for firm and time specific factors we specify our return generating model I for which independent variables are identified in the left column of Table 4 . Least squared coefficients for model I are estimated for each firm, with individual excess returns used as the dependent variable. Time series data from 250 days prior to the announcement through to 250 days after the implementation date, the end of the study period, or the firm death date, whichever is first, are used to estimate the coefficients. Event day abnormal returns are captured using dummy variables for the announcement date and implementation date. The long run pre implementation and post implementation change to the agency risk premium are captured by the model intercept and intercept dummy variable coefficients respectively.
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Insert Table 4 about here Table 4 show that the announcement day abnormal return dummy variable coefficient is positive and significant at the p < 0.05 level for the AIM2MAIN group but negative and significant at the p < 0.01 level for the MAIN2AIM group. The signs of the implementation day abnormal return dummy variable coefficients are also consistent with our hypotheses, although only the MAIN2AIM sample is significant at the p < 0.05 level. Likewise, the mean coefficients on the intercept dummy variables are negative for the AIM2MAIN sample and positive for the MAIN2AIM sample in line with our hypotheses, while the test statistics are significant at the p < 0.01 and p < 0.05 levels respectively. Thus on a risk adjusted basis, the value of firms transferring to the main market increases immediately following the announcement and transfer to the main market, but subsequent risk adjusted returns are negative as in hypothesis one. In contrast, the value of firms transferring to the AIM market decreases immediately following the announcement and implementation but subsequent returns are positive as predicted by hypothesis two. These findings are consistent with those of Tse and Davos (2004) with respect to AMEX -NASDAQ -AMEX migrations.
Consistent with our two hypotheses, the results in
Examination of the control variable coefficients reported in Table 4 shows that in the AIM2MAIN sample the interaction dummy variable coefficient testing for changes in firms' sensitivity to the market return post implementation is not significant, while for the MAIN2AIM sample the coefficient is negative and significant, at the p < 0.05 level. This indicates that MAIN2AIM firms' sensitivities to market returns, i.e. betas, decline post migration. This finding mirrors that of Bacman et al. (2002) who observe increases in market risk for firms that migrate up to the senior segment of the French stock exchange.
We argue that market risk becomes less relevant than agency risk when firms migrate to AIM. This is because AIM firms often have low liquidity and concentrated ownership, so they arguably have more in common with private equity than firms on the main market and as a consequence issues of control rights are of greater importance. Bonding is lower for AIM firms, with the result that agency risk is higher, creating uncertainty -although this uncertainty is not necessarily observable in the form of stock price volatility. Nonetheless, the uncertainty is priced by a return premium that results in higher total shareholder returns following the downward migration.
To summarize, in hypotheses (1) and (2) we argue that the two sections of the LSE constitute different bonding regimes. Firms migrating between the two regimes are subjected to a change in bonding obligations that directly cause a change in the level of agency risk faced by their minority investors. In other words, in the low bonding regime of the AIM, agency risk is high. Conversely agency risk is low in the high bonding regime of the main section of the LSE. We test our hypotheses using the general specification of return generating model I. This controls for the market, firm size and the book to market risk factors of Fama and French (1993) ; industry risk; the possible influence of changes in liquidity during the pre and post event period on the return generating process (Liu 2006) 8 ;
and the possibility that return generating model parameters such as the intercept and market risk may differ before and after the implementation date (see for example, Baker and Edelman 1992a; Bacmann et al. 2002; Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino 2010) . Following Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , the bid-ask-spread variable controls for both liquidity and time variation in information asymmetry. Thus, by a process of eliminating other possible causes, we attribute the abnormal returns isolated by our model to changes in the agency risk premium resulting from switches between the two bonding regimes.
In order to mitigate the potential thin-trading biases identified by Dimson (1979) and others, the specification of model I also includes lagged firm returns, lagged market excess returns and lagged size and style factors. Both groups of firms, but especially firms in the MAIN2AIM sample, frequently experience days when no trading occurs. Therefore, we implement an additional mitigation for thin-trading that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been implemented in prior research. Specifically, we substitute market excess returns for firm excess returns on days when both of the following two conditions are met simultaneously: (a) a firm's stock price does not change and (b) its trading volume is zero.
These two conditions amount to missing data, because on zero volume days a return of zero does not necessarily reflect the return an investor could have made had they attempted to trade. Hence we refer to such days as 'no-price days' (NPDs). Our substitution is motivated by the principle that the least biased substitute for missing firm level data is likely to be the market excess return. We also encounter missing data related to free float and the bid-ask spread: for free float data we substitute 100% for the missing value, while for bid-ask spread data we substitute the mean bid-ask spread observed for that firm over the 501 day event period.
Robustness tests
We carried out a number of robustness checks of the results reported in Table 4 , including: (1) not substituting market returns for firm returns on days when no trading or price change occurred; (2) excluding firms in which the total trading volume in the year prior to implementation was less than 3% of shares outstanding; (3) varying the specification of model I to include additional lags on the control variables; (4) omitting nonsignificant control variables such as the free float; (5) imposing winsorizations of 2.5% on each tail; (6) partitioning the data into quartiles of calendar time for implementation dates, quartiles of market capitalization and quartiles of average bid-ask spread one year prior to implementation. In all of our robustness checks we obtained qualitatively similar results with consistent coefficient signs on the key variables of interest, although significance levels naturally vary.
Of course notwithstanding these robustness tests, it is possible that other factors might explain the returns which we attribute to changes in agency risk. In a further effort to investigate competing explanations for our results we undertake a cross sectional analysis Table 4 , we undertake a cross sectional analysis of the above four key coefficients from model I. This is achieved by setting each coefficient as the dependent variable in four variations of a cross sectional regression of model II.
The independent variables in model II are listed in Tables 5 and 6 for the two groups of firms respectively. For each firm they include: the model I coefficients other than the respective dependent variable in model II; the market value percentile rank on the implementation day relative to the whole sample migration category; the average bid-ask spread percentage over the period t -255 through t -6 ; the standardized daily trading volume; the average free float percentage over the period t -255 through t -6 and the implementation lag in trading days. In addition, we include dummy variables identifying whether or not other information such as financial results were disclosed on the announcement date;
whether additional capital was raised at the time of the migration and whether shareholders were given a vote on the proposed migration; and dummy variables identifying the stated motivation for the migration, as described in Table 1 .
The basic premise of model II is that there may be associations between firm characteristics and the abnormal returns identified using model I. Investigation of betweenfirm variation in model I coefficients with the aid of a cross sectional regression allows a richer exploration of the data than a panel estimation using either fixed or random effects. This is because the cross sectional regression takes into account between firm variations in both slope and intercept coefficients in model I.
-------------------------------
Insert Table 5 about here Tables 5 and 6 Nonetheless, the model II coefficients that are significant at the < 0.10 level or less indicate that for the AIM2MAIN sample, firms which exhibit the greatest pre-implementation abnormal returns undergo the greatest reversal in fortunes following implementation, as evidenced by the negative relationship between the model I intercept dummy and model I intercept coefficients, significant at p < 0.05. In a study of firms seeking promotion from the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Baker and Edelman (1992a) observe a similar pre migration rise in firm values and a post migration fall. Comparable results with respect to upward migrations on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) are found by Lamba and Arif (1997) .
Examination of
-------------------------------
Insert Table 6 about here
Corresponding model II coefficients for the MAIN2AIM sample are reported in Table 6 .
Even fewer of the model II coefficients are significant and the adjusted R 2 values are lower still, further reducing the potential for competing explanations for the abnormal returns observed in model I. Overall, the weak significance of the model II coefficients with respect to MAIN2AIM is reassuring as it implies that most of the relevant information is captured by model I, with little new information added by model II.
In sections 2 and 4 we also mention that tax differences between the two segments might result in trading around listing migrations as different tax clienteles of investors move into or out of the migrating firm in order to benefit from or avoid losing tax reliefs as a result of the migration. Of course it is possible that tax, or similar clientele related changes in the investor base of firms, may result in the abnormal returns observed. However, if this is the case, the results appear somewhat counter intuitive given that loss of the reliefs available to firms migrating from the AIM to the main section might be expected to result in shareholders exiting the firm and prices being depressed prior to the migration. In fact, our results appear to be the opposite, leading us to suggest that changes in agency risk outweigh any tax clientele effects that may result from the switch. Arguably, our results are strengthened by the fact that the tax benefits of a migration to AIM do not counterbalance the negative influence of increased agency risk. It is also worth noting that the stated motivation of achieving 'tax benefits to investors' for firms migrating down to the AIM is not significant in the results reported in Table 6 . Furthermore, our model I specification indirectly controls for transitory changes in liquidity around the listing migrations by including variables that capture time series changes in three liquidity proxies. Therefore, we are confident that the returns that we attribute to differences in bonding and agency risk exist after controlling for trading activity resulting from clientele changes in the investor base.
Summary and conclusions
After controlling for firm size, market, style, industry and liquidity, we find that firms graduating from the AIM to the main section of the LSE generate positive returns on the day the decision is announced. For firms moving in the opposite direction, corresponding returns are negative. It thus appears that announcements of the intention to move up and down are associated with good and bad news, respectively. After the listing change is implemented, the pattern is reversed for both categories of firm so that firms moving up earn lower returns while firms moving down earn higher returns. For firms transferring down from the main market to the AIM, we argue that the improved performance post implementation is a reward to shareholders for bearing increased levels of agency risk. In contrast, because investors value the higher bonding requirements of the main market, firms transferring up to the main market experience positive returns on the announcement days but subsequently have lower returns that reflect the lower cost of equity capital as a result of reduced agency risk. The fact that post migration returns are abnormal, i.e. persisting after comprehensively controlling for other risk factors, implies that the remaining agency risk earns a return premium additional to that attributable to these other factors.
Our conclusions are subject to the caveat that we have not measured the relationship between bonding cost and firm performance directly. However, we mitigate this concern by including a wide variety of control variables to eliminate competing explanations for our results. Our controls demonstrate that liquidity changes do not account for the changes in Hence it seems plausible that firms moving down have reached a size at which the additional bonding costs of maintaining a main market listing are no longer outweighed by the reduced cost of capital arising from the lower agency risks of a main market listing. AIM2MAIN firms are those that transfer from the AIM to the main market. MAIN2AIM firms are those transferring in the opposite direction. The first announcement of the intended change of listing was searched for a statement justifying the change. Statements were then grouped into the categories identified below, the titles of which record the meaning of, or paraphrase, the justifications provided by the individual firms. Some firms gave multiple justifications; hence, the total number of justifications in each sample is greater than the total number of firms despite the fact that 42.3% of AIM2MAIN and 15.6% of MAIN2AIM firms do not give any justification. The average disclosure proportion reflects the average of the number of justifications given by each firm divided by the total number of justification categories identified below. The category "shareholder protection statement" records firms in the MAIN2AIM sample that found it necessary to reassure investors that their interests would not be adversely affected by the switch. AIM2MAIN firms are those that migrate from the AIM to the main market. MAIN2AIM firms are those migrating in the opposite direction. Other abbreviations are as follows: number of observations (No.), largest observation (Max.), smallest observation (Min.), average (Av.), market capitalization (Mkt. Cap.), implementation (Imp.), bid-ask spread (BAS), no price days in which both trading volume and price changes are zero (NPD). 
